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ABSTRACT
One of the most commonly cited studies on the effect of child subsidies on fertility, Whittington, Alm
and Peters (1990), claimed a large positive effect of child tax benefits on fertility using time series
methods. We revisit this question in light of recent increases in child tax benefits by replicating this
earlier study and extending the analysis. We do not find strong evidence to justify the model specification
from the original paper. Moreover, even if the original specfication is appropriate, we show that the
Whittington et al. results are not robust to more general measures of child tax benefits. While we do
not find evidence that child tax benefits affect the level of fertility, we find some evidence of a short-run
fertility response that occurs with a two-year lag.
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Standard economic theory tells us that the demand for children is inﬂuenced by the cost of
raising children. Holding other things constant, a decrease in the cost of raising children
should lead to an increase in the demand for children. As shown in Figure 1, the average
value of the U.S. child tax subsidy adjusted for inﬂation has increased from under $850
in 1980 to more than $2,000 in 2005.1 The U.S.D.A. estimates that annual expenditures
on children range from $7,580 to $16,970 depending on the age of the child and household
income (Lino 2007); thus, the $1,150 real increase in child tax beneﬁts can be thought of as
a 7 to 15 percent discount on the cost of raising children. How much of an eﬀect (if any) did
this reduction in the cost of raising children have on fertility?
Whittington, Alm and Peters (1990) were the ﬁrst to seriously estimate the responsiveness
of fertility to child tax beneﬁt changes. Their analysis of time series data from 1913 to 1984
suggests that the U.S. fertility rate is very responsive to child tax beneﬁts. They estimate
that a $100 increase (in 2005 dollars) in the tax value of the personal exemption would
increase the general fertility rate by 2.1 to 4.2 births (a 3.2 to 6.5 percent increase).2
While the sign of the estimated eﬀect is not unexpected, the strong and robust magnitude
of the Whittington et al. (1990) estimate is surprising. If a $100 increase in annual child tax
beneﬁts could increase fertility by 3.2 to 6.5 percent, should we have expected a 32 to 65
percent increase in the U.S. fertility rate in response to the $1,000 Child Tax Credit, holding
all other factors constant?3
Since Whittington et al. (1990), a handful of empirical studies have estimated a fertility
response from changes in child tax beneﬁts or other child subsidies. One set of papers uses
1The details regarding the calculation of the average per-child tax subsidy are given in the Appendix.
2Whittington et al. report their results in 1967 dollars. Their estimates of the eﬀect of the value of the
personal exemption in 1967 dollars on the general fertility rate range from 0.121 to 0.236. Converting the
dollar amounts to 2005 dollars using the CPI-U, we ﬁnd that their estimates range from 0.021 to 0.042.
3From 1997 (the year the Child Tax Credit was passed) to 2005, the general fertility rate in the United
States increased by 4.9 percent. Note however that eligibility restrictions and interactions in the tax code
make the $1,000 Child Tax Credit worth much less than this amount on average. From 1997 to 2005, the
average child subsidy increased by approximately $550 in real terms.
1similar aggregate time-series or pooled time-series methods to examine the long-run eﬀect
of child tax beneﬁts on fertility (e.g. Georgellis and Wall (1992), Zhang, Quan and van
Meerbergen (1994), Gauthier and Hatzius (1997), Huang (2002)). These studies generally
ﬁnd that fertility responds to tax beneﬁts, though the estimated responses are smaller than
that found by Whittington et al.
Another set of studies uses individual data and ﬁnds mixed results as to whether ﬁnancial
incentives inﬂuence fertility in the short run. While Whittington (1992) ﬁnds evidence in the
PSID that tax beneﬁts strongly inﬂuence family size in the United States, Baughman and
Dickert-Conlin (2003) ﬁnd that the largest estimated fertility response to Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) expansions in the 1990s (for married non-white women) was less than
half the magnitude reported in Whittington et al. and many subpopulations display no
economically signiﬁcant response. Similarly, Laroque and Salanie (2005) ﬁnd evidence of
only a small eﬀect on fertility in France, despite the generosity of French child subsidies.
Milligan (2005) reports fertility response estimates of a similar magnitude as Whittington
et al. (1990) using data from Quebec. However, it is likely this large fertility eﬀect is in part
due to the temporary nature of the Quebec subsidy program; Parent and Wang (2007) show
that women may have had children earlier in order to claim the subsidy with no change in
their completed fertility. Most recently, Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2007) ﬁnd strong
eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on fertility among low-income populations in Israel.
Despite the lack of agreement in the literature, Whittington et al. (1990) is cited by
an increasing number of publications (many in non-economics journals) as evidence of a
strong link between child tax beneﬁts and fertility. In this paper, we revisit and extend the
analysis in Whittington et al. along two dimensions. First, we update the data series with
21 additional years of data and broader measures of child tax beneﬁts. While Whittington
et al.’s analysis was limited to the real tax value of the personal exemption, we incorporate
the child tax credit (CTC) and the earned income tax credit (EITC) in our measure of child
subsidies. As illustrated in Figure 1, these additional components of child tax beneﬁts grew
2in importance over the last two decades and account for much of the signiﬁcant growth in
the value of the average child tax subsidy; currently, they make up more than half of the
total subsidy available to families with children. Extending and updating the data series
allows us to develop more precise estimates of the relationship between fertility and child
tax beneﬁts and reexamine the relationship in light of recent increases in these subsidies.
Second, we also revisit the model speciﬁcation and estimation procedure from the original
paper. We ﬁnd that the variables in the analysis are highly persistent which raises concerns
about the potential for spurious regression results using the authors’ original speciﬁcation.
Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence to justify the model speciﬁcation from the
original paper.
We also show that even if the original speciﬁcation is correct, the results of Whittington
et al. (1990) are speciﬁc only to the personal exemption series and are not robust to broader
measures of tax subsidies. Because a tax subsidy in the form of a child tax credit should
aﬀect fertility in the same way as a tax subsidy from the personal exemption, this ﬁnding
casts additional doubt on the results of Whittington et al.
Finally, we provide an illustrative analysis of the short-run eﬀects of child tax beneﬁts on
the general fertility rate by estimating the models in ﬁrst diﬀerences, under the assumption
that the variables we found to be highly persistent are in fact unit roots. We ﬁnd evidence
that child tax beneﬁts increase fertility with a two-year lag. However, the total short-run
eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. These results suggest that tax beneﬁts do not
aﬀect the overall level of fertility, but are consistent with an eﬀect on the timing of fertility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation methods used to
replicate the original Whittington et al. results. In Section 3 we update the data and report
our new results. Section 4 concludes. Details on the data reconstruction are relegated to the
Appendix.
32 1913-1984: Data and Replication
Whittington et al. (1990) regressed the general fertility rate from 1913 to 1984 on a set
of explanatory variables that they argued would aﬀect fertility: male and asset income,
unemployment, infant mortality, immigration, female wage, and binary variables for World
War II and the availability of the birth control pill. The dependent variable is the general
fertility rate, deﬁned as the number of births per thousand women age 15-44. While some
of the series were reported in the appendix of the published paper, others have been lost
since the paper’s publication. We reconstructed the missing series using the footnotes and
references in Whittington et al.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the reconstructed series and those reported in
Whittington et al. (1990). It is clear that there are small diﬀerences between the two datasets,
even for some series that were copied directly from the Whittington et al. appendix. In
fact, of those series for which we obtained original data (general fertility rate, personal
exemption, male and asset income, and female wage), only the personal exemption series
exactly matches the reported moments. The other series are either diﬀerent than the series
used to report the summary statistics or some error was made in computing the mean and
standard deviation.4 The unemployment, infant mortality, and immigration series that we
constructed quite accurately match the reported moments.
The primary variable of interest for Whittington et al. (1990) is the real tax value of the
personal exemption for dependents. Today, the personal exemption is only one of several
child subsidy provisions in the federal tax code accounting for about one-third to one-half
of the total child subsidy. However, for the 1913-1984 period considered in Whittington
et al., the personal exemption was the primary source of the implicit child subsidy, never
accounting for less than 90 percent of the total child subsidy. The statutory value of the
4Brigitte Madrian generously gave us access to a 1991 letter she received from Leslie Whittington in
which the full male and asset income series used in Whittington et al. (1990) is reported. According to this
letter, the average female wage index values for 1972 and 1919 were typos. However, correcting these typos
leads to greater discrepancies between both the reported moments and the replication results, so we use the
series as reported in Whittington et al. in the replication analysis.
4personal exemption for dependents changed only nine times between 1913 and 1984; however,
its real tax value ﬂuctuates substantially due to changes in marginal tax rates and the price
index.
Following Whittington et al. (1990) we estimate the following reduced form equation for
the period 1913 to 1984:
General Fertility Ratet = β0 + β1 Personal Exemptiont + β2 Male and Asset Incomet
+ β3 Unemploymentt + β4 Infant Mortalityt + β5 Immigrationt
+ β6 Female Waget + β7 Pillt + β8 WW2t + β9 Time Trendt + ǫt.
(1)
Whittington et al. (1990) estimate equation (1) by FGLS because of concerns about (ﬁrst-
order) serial correlation. Further details on the estimation approach are not included in the
original paper. We report the original estimates of the primary speciﬁcation as reported in
Whittington et al. as Model (1) in Table 2. Next, we report the regular OLS estimates
using the replicated data with Newey-West standard errors as Model (2) in Table 2. Finally,
we report the results using Prais-Winsten FGLS (with a single iteration) and the replicated
data as Model (3) in Table 2. Model (3) closely replicates the original Model (1) results.5
The estimated coeﬃcient on the tax value of the personal exemption is very close to the
reported value in Whittington et al. In addition, the remaining coeﬃcient estimates are also
similar to Whittington et al.’s results.6
It is vital that Equation (1) is correctly speciﬁed, in the sense that it represents a long-run
relationship between the primary variables of interest7. This issue is of paramount impor-
5At ﬁrst glance, there appears to be a substantial discrepancy between Model (3) and Model (1), as
measured by the R2. In GLS estimation R2 is not well deﬁned, so it is unclear what deﬁnition was used by
Whittington et al. Using the total sum of squares from the original OLS regression and the sum of squared
residuals from Model (3) yields an R2 of 0.919. While this technique does not give an accurate description
of the ﬁt of Model (3), it does represents a plausible method that may have been used to arrive at their
reported R2 of 0.916.
6We experimented with various estimation and iteration schemes and this provided the closest results.
Slight diﬀerences in the data (including the series that were obtained from the paper itself) and potential
diﬀerences in details of the estimation procedure likely explain deviations from the original results.
7We take as given that a single-equation analysis is appropriate. Discussion of the feasibility of this
assumption is beyond the scope of this paper.
5tance in the present application because these series are highly persistent. We conducted
unit-root tests on the series in Equation (1) and found that the only series where we could
reject the unit-root null hypothesis at a size of 10% was the unemployment rate and even
this series exhibited a high degree of persistence.8 We describe these results to emphasize
the high degree of persistence in these series without taking a stand as to whether or not
they have an exact unit root. If there does not exist a long-run relationship then a regression
in levels, such as Equation (1), would be inappropriate and likely to produce spurious re-
sults.9 In fact, Wooldridge (2009), a well-known undergraduate econometric textbook, uses
Whittington et al. as an example of a spurious regression.
3 1913-2005: Updated Data and Results
3.1 Updated Data
We construct an updated dataset with 21 additional years (1985-2005) of data. In so doing,
we examined each of the reconstructed (1913-1984) series to determine whether a better
source was available. We found more up-to-date sources for several of the data series and
use these rather than the reconstructed series in the updated data. Details regarding the
data construction are provided in the Appendix.
We follow the Whittington et al. (1990) methodology in calculating the value of the
personal exemption as described in the Appendix. We also construct a measure of the total
value of child tax beneﬁts in the federal income tax, as recent tax changes have increased the
8We conducted the unit-root tests of Harvey, Leybourne and Taylor (2009) and Carrion-i-Silvestre, Kim
and Perron (2009) on the updated data. The tests of Harvey et al. (2009) are constructed to accommodate
uncertainty over the nature of the initial condition or the presence of a linear time trend. The tests of Carrion-
i-Silvestre et al. (2009) allow us to accommodate a structural break induced by the widespread availability
of the birth-control pill. The autoregressive lag lengths were chosen by the variant of the modiﬁed Akaike
information criterion (MAIC) described in Perron and Qu (2007).
9Recall that the so-called “spurious regression” problem is not conﬁned to unit-root processes. Similar
eﬀects may arise even when the series are stationary (see, for example, Granger (2003), Granger, Hyung
and Jeon (2001), Su (2008)). In addition, it should be noted that autocorrelation correction may ameliorate
spurious regression concerns.
6relative importance of other child tax beneﬁts. In addition to the tax value of the personal
exemption, the total child subsidy series also includes the value of the child tax credit (CTC)
and the earned income tax credit (EITC).
The child tax credit acts as a child subsidy in a similar manner as the personal exemption,
providing tax beneﬁts to parents with children. However, the EITC is a tax credit that both
increases in value with the number of children and aﬀects the after-tax wage of recipients.
Therefore, the EITC could also aﬀect fertility through its eﬀect on the opportunity cost
of time. However, theory and empirical evidence both suggest that the eﬀect of the EITC
on the opportunity cost of time is minimal.10 Because the labor supply eﬀect is weak in
aggregate and the child tax beneﬁts from the EITC are large, the EITC acts more like a
child subsidy than a wage subsidy and we think it is appropriate to include the EITC in the
measure of the total child subsidy. However, we also report results excluding the EITC from
the total child subsidy series.
The average value of these credits is calculated by dividing the total federal tax expen-
diture on these credits by the number of children in the United States in each year. The
summary statistics for the extended data are reported in Table 3.
3.2 Updated Results: Original Speciﬁcation
Table 4 summarizes our ﬁrst set of results. In Column (1), we report our replication of
Whittington et al. (1990)’s main speciﬁcation with one change – the typos in Whittington et
al.’s series are corrected (see the discussion in footnote 4 and the Appendix). These results
are reported in constant 1967 dollars and are calculated using data series from the years
1913-1984. For Columns (2) and later, we make an additional change: the value of the child
10Theory suggests that the eﬀect of the EITC on female labor supply is ambiguous except for single women
not in the labor force where there is an unambiguous increase in the likelihood of labor force participation.
The empirical literature ﬁnds that the EITC does increase the labor force participation of single women
mothers (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). However, the EITC appears to reduce the labor force participation
of married women (Eissa and Hoynes 2004). The reduction in labor force participation by married women
to some extent oﬀsets the increase in labor force participation by single women. In terms of hours of work,
the empirical literature ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the EITC on aggregate female labor supply (Eissa and
Hoynes 2006).
7tax subsidy, male income, and female wage are converted to constant 2005 dollars. The eﬀect
of changing the base year can be seen clearly in the coeﬃcient on the tax subsidy: whereas
our replication of Whittington et al. in Column (1) showed that $100 in tax beneﬁts (in
1967 dollars) are associated with an increase in the general fertility rate of 9.9 births, the
results in Column (2) show that the comparable change in the general fertility rate for $100
in tax beneﬁts (in 2005 dollars) is 1.7 births. This value provides a benchmark against which
results from our subsequent analyses can be measured.
Column (3) begins the analysis using our extended data series for 1913-2005. The results
in Column (3) show that using updated data sources and extending the data through 2005
reduces but does not substantively change the key coeﬃcient estimated in Whittington et
al. (1990). However, the results are sensitive to the deﬁnition of tax beneﬁts. In Column
(4) we repeat the analysis including the child tax credit in the tax subsidy series. While the
coeﬃcient on the child tax subsidy variable has the same sign as in Column (2), it is less
than half the size and no longer signiﬁcant. In Column (5) we show that a similar conclusion
holds when the EITC is added to the tax subsidy series. The main results of Whittington
et al. are weaker but still present in the extended time horizon, but are not robust to more
general measures of child tax beneﬁts.
The speciﬁcations presented in all ﬁve columns of Table 4 are not valid if there is no
long-run relationship.11 We perform a variety of cointegration tests, both residual-based and
systems-based, to determine if there is evidence for a long-run relationship. The indicator
for the availability of the birth-control pill acts as a structural break (with known timing),
so we perform tests that allow for this.
On balance the tests are suggestive that no cointegrating relationship occurs. However,
the results are at times sensitive to the exact speciﬁcation. In the residual-based test of
Westerlund and Edgerton (2006), which has a null hypothesis of no cointegration, we ﬁnd
no evidence to reject. However, using the residual-based test of Arai and Kurozumi (2007),
11We also consider more general, dynamic models in the Appendix.
8which has a null hypothesis of cointegration, the test results are sensitive to the speciﬁcation.
For a lag length of less than three, the null hypothesis of cointegration is rejected for a test
with nominal size of 5 percent. However, with a lag length of three, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis for some speciﬁcations at this size. Meanwhile, the systems-based test of
Saikkonen and L¨ utkepohl (2000), for most speciﬁcations, suggests either no cointegration
or a cointegrating relationship only between those variables outside the variables of interest
(i.e., excluding the general fertility rate and any subsidy variable). The test results and
further discussion may be found in the Appendix.
We view the cointegration tests as largely suggestive that no cointegrating relationship
exists. They do not completely rule out the claim that the original speciﬁcation is appro-
priate. For example, it is well known that the performance of cointegration tests can be
sensitive to the exact form of persistence in the variables. However, the key point is that
even if we assume that the original speciﬁcation is appropriate, which means the results
from Table 4 are not spurious, Columns (4) and (5) and the results in the Appendix show
that there is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of an eﬀect of tax subsidies on the general
fertility rate once the data are updated and we include more comprehensive measures of tax
subsidies.
3.3 Short-Run Eﬀects
If there is not a long-run relationship between child tax beneﬁts and fertility then the Whit-
tington et al. (1990) results are driven by the high persistence of the variables in the model
rather than a meaningful relationship between these variables. In this section we will con-
sider a unit-root speciﬁcation as illustrative of a model with a high degree of persistence.
The spurious regression problem can apply to any regression involving persistent variables,
not only those with unit roots. However, the unit-root speciﬁcation is convenient because it
allows us to estimate the short-run relationship by simply diﬀerencing the variables, which
may exist even if there is no long-run relationship.
9To produce estimates of the short-run eﬀect, we consider a regression similar to Equation
(1), except using diﬀerenced variables. Table 5 summarizes the results from these regressions.
Column (1) displays the results for diﬀerenced variables over the time period originally
considered in Whittington et al. (1990) using the replication dataset converted to 2005
dollars. Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient on the tax subsidy ﬂips sign and decreases in magnitude.
In Column (2), we run the same speciﬁcation but utilize the extended data series. Columns
(3) and (4) show the results for the other two child tax subsidy measures. Across all four
models, the estimated short-run eﬀect is negative.
As pointed out in Whittington et al. (1990), there are several reasons to believe that a
fertility response from changes in covariates may occur with a lag. The birth of a child will
lag the decision to have a child by at least nine months and frequently longer, and therefore
the relevant variable in analyzing fertility in year t may be the covariate’s value in year t−1.
Covariates in time t may have little inﬂuence on fertility in year t.12 Moreover, there is a
reason to believe that the fertility response from changes in child tax beneﬁts may be even
more delayed. While a fertility response would not likely be observed until at least one year
after a change to child tax beneﬁts, it takes some time for taxpayers to learn that a tax
change has taken place. Changes to the tax code are often made while the tax year is well
underway. Individuals are not likely to learn about tax changes until they do their taxes
(by April of the following year). While this may have an immediate eﬀect on the decision
to have a child, the actual birth is then realized with a delay. Therefore, while a single lag
may be appropriate for the other regressors, the real value of child tax beneﬁts should enter
the fertility equation with at least two lags. That is, we posit that a tax policy change in
year t may not aﬀect the decision to have children until at least year t + 1 and thus would
not aﬀect the total fertility rate until at least year t + 2.
Thus, we explore whether the short-run eﬀect changes when additional lags of the child
tax subsidy are included. Table 6 reports the results from a regression of the diﬀerenced
12Immigration by women of childbearing age is an exception since some women may be pregnant at the
time of immigration.
10total fertility rate on varying number of lags of the child tax subsidy. The child tax subsidy
variable speciﬁed here includes all three components of the child tax subsidy: the personal
exemption, the child tax credit and the EITC. The current and lagged values of all other
controls are included in the estimations although the estimated coeﬃcients are not reported.
Table 6 also reports the measure of the estimated total short-run eﬀect of tax beneﬁts, equal
to the sum of the coeﬃcients of all lagged child tax subsidy variables, with standard errors.
The results in Table 6 suggest that there is a statistically signiﬁcant short-run eﬀect of
changes in child tax beneﬁts on changes in fertility with two lags. However, the estimated
total short-run eﬀect across the four speciﬁcations are small and statistically insigniﬁcant,
ranging from -0.004 to 0.010. The point estimates suggest that a $100 increase in the real
value of child tax beneﬁts in 2005 dollars is associated with an increase of approximately 0
to 1 birth. The magnitude of this total eﬀect is much smaller than the magnitude of the
Whittington et al. (1990) estimate of 1.7 births as calculated in Table 4, Column (2), and is
statistically insigniﬁcant across all speciﬁcations.
These results provide weak evidence of an overall short-run response of fertility to tax
beneﬁts for this particular speciﬁcation, under the assumption that the variables found to
be highly persistent are in fact unit roots. Our estimates of the total eﬀect are small and
generally positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant.
4 Conclusion
The eﬀect of tax policy on fertility rates is often neglected in the literature on federal tax
policy, even though child tax beneﬁts are large and have recently grown in importance. One
of the most cited studies on this topic, Whittington et al. (1990), estimates a very large
fertility rate response to the tax value of the dependent exemption. We have updated their
analysis by incorporating 21 additional years of data along with more general measures of
tax beneﬁts for having children. We also revisited their original speciﬁcation and do not ﬁnd
11strong evidence that their original speciﬁcation is appropriate. However, even if the original
speciﬁcation is appropriate we ﬁnd in our updated analysis that the results of Whittington
et al. are not robust to more general measures of child tax beneﬁts.
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15Figure 1: General Fertility Rate and Real Average Per Child Tax Subsidy
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16Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1913–1984
Replicated Data Whittington et al.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
General Fertility Rate 72 95.6 19.81 95.5 19.64
Personal Exemption 72 100.4 65.88 100.4 65.88
Male and Asset Income 72 7,467.38 2,926.06 7,466.37 2,982.78
Unemployment 72 0.071 0.054 0.071 0.053
Infant Mortality 72 43.02 26.84 43.02 26.84
Immigration 72 0.003 0.0036 0.003 0.0035
Female Wage 72 1.35 0.585 1.22 0.532
Pill 72 0.306 0.464 0.305 0.464
WW II 72 0.069 0.256 0.069 0.256
Time Trend 72 36.5 20.93 36.5 20.92
Variables expressed in constant 1967 dollars.
17Table 2: Comparison of Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Whittington et al. OLS Prais-Winsten
Personal Exemption 0.121 0.178 0.116
(0.0446)** (0.0977) (0.0449)**
Male and Asset Income -0.0004 0.0035 0.0007
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0025)
Unemployment -73.43 -68.12 -68.19
(34.20)** (25.818)* (34.004)**
Infant Mortality 0.083 0.393 0.0351
(0.255) (0.321) (0.251)
Immigration 774.24 964.13 760.71
(311.31)** (329.44)** (304.98)**
Female Wage 5.647 15.427 5.629
(15.686) (5.286)** (5.036)
Pill -10.856 -25.383 -12.014
(6.126)* (11.961)* (6.028)*
WW II -17.223 -29.419 -17.863
(4.989)** (8.057)** (4.854)**
Time Trend -0.539 -0.843 -0.741
(0.538) (0.543) (0.510)
Intercept 102.979 55.944 104.130
(24.666)** (25.831)* (23.368)**
Observations 72 72 72
R
2 0.916 0.829 0.749
Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables expressed in constant 1967 dollars.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
Model (1) reports the regression results from the Whittington et al. paper.
Model (2) OLS estimates with Newey-West standard errors.
Model (3) Prais-Winsten FGLS estimation with a single iteration.
18Table 3: Summary Statistics, 1913–2005
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
General Fertility Rate 93 88.9 21.4 63.6 126.6
Personal Exemption 93 625.9 347.9 0 1398
Personal Exemption + CTC 93 661.1 384.8 0 1501
Personal Exemption + CTC + EITC 93 741.7 479.1 0 2038
Male & Asset Income 93 31,287 11,681 17,043 50,169
Unemployment 93 0.068 0.048 0.012 0.249
Infant Mortality 93 35.15 27.77 6.7 101
Immigration 93 0.00351 0.00257 0.00028 0.01505
Female Wage 93 7.59 3.34 2.14 12.93
Pill 93 0.462 0.501 0 1
WW II 93 0.054 0.227 0 1
Variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
19Table 4: Comparison of Estimation Results in Levels
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal Exemption 0.099 0.017 0.011
(0.044)** (0.008)** (0.006)*
Personal Exemption + CTC 0.007
(0.005)
Personal Exemption + CTC + EITC 0.005
(0.004)
Male and Asset Income -0.0003 -0.00005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.0004) (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)**
Unemployment -68.019 -68.019 -86.711 -80.939 -84.576
(33.684)** (33.684)** (25.079)*** (24.068)*** (24.254)***
Infant Mortality -0.013 -0.013 0.057 -0.041 -0.086
(0.247) (0.247) (0.157) (0.141) (0.139)
Immigration 698.917 698.917 1,079.458 989.809 979.596
(299.761)** (299.761)** (297.470)*** (285.178)*** (288.937)***
Female Wage 16.545 2.829 4.137 3.847 4.257
(14.129) (2.416) (2.349)* (2.240)* (2.240)*
Pill -10.937 -10.937 -6.080 -5.332 -5.436
(5.902)* (5.902)* (4.697) (4.562) (4.631)
WW II -16.269 -16.269 -13.736 -11.689 -11.371
(4.772)*** (4.772)*** (3.865)*** (3.653)*** (3.669)***
Time Trend -0.969 -0.969 -0.527 -0.625 -0.718
(0.590) (0.590) (0.348) (0.346)* (0.365)*
Constant 108.208 108.208 119.724 128.591 132.707
(23.052)*** (23.052)*** (15.527)*** (13.919)*** (13.510)***
Observations 72 72 93 93 93
R2 0.745 0.745 0.804 0.793 0.792
Standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
Model (1): Replication of Whittington et al. (1990) with typos corrected (see text).
Model (2): Model (1) with variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
Model (3): Model (2) with extended data series for sample period 1913-2005.
Model (4): Model (3) with child tax beneﬁts deﬁned by personal exemption and child tax credit.
Model (5): Model (3) with child tax beneﬁts deﬁned by personal exemption, child tax credit, and EITC.
2
0Table 5: Comparison of Estimation Results in First Diﬀerences
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal Exemption -0.014 -0.013
(0.006)** (0.005)***
Personal Exemption + CTC -0.008
(0.004)*
Personal Exemption + CTC + EITC -0.007
(0.004)*
Male and Asset Income -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment -20.985 -10.041 -8.391 -9.063
(25.647) (21.515) (22.030) (22.130)
Infant Mortality -0.042 -0.072 -0.055 -0.053
(0.178) (0.157) (0.159) (0.159)
Immigration 68.878 198.098 191.007 195.459
(182.199) (195.021) (200.214) (201.176)
Female Wage 1.278 2.127 1.950 1.934
(1.563) (1.834) (1.871) (1.876)
Pill -1.910 -0.688 -0.524 -0.447
(1.113)* (0.897) (0.924) (0.931)
WW II 5.138 4.703 3.629 3.483
(2.441)** (2.241)** (2.229) (2.227)
Constant -0.618 -1.272 -1.177 -1.176
(0.951) (0.914) (0.936) (0.940)
Observations 71 92 92 92
R
2 0.203 0.145 0.108 0.104
Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
Model (1): Replication of Whittington et al. (1990) performed in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Model (2): Model (1) with extended data series for sample period 1913-2005.
Model (3): Model (2) with child tax beneﬁts deﬁned by personal exemption and child tax credit.
Model (4): Model (2) with child tax beneﬁts deﬁned by personal exemption, child tax credit, and EITC.
21Table 6: Short Run Eﬀects of Child Tax Beneﬁts on Fertility, 1913–2005
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidy -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−1 0.001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−2 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−3 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−4 -0.003
(0.004)
Measure of Total Eﬀect -0.004 0.008 0.010 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R
2 0.264 0.349 0.350 0.355
Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
All speciﬁcations include current and lagged values of all independent variables on the right-hand
side. Only current values of Pill and World War II included. All analysis was done with the updated data
series. Total Child Tax Subsidy deﬁned by personal exemption, child tax credit, and EITC. The column
number signiﬁes the number of lags of the child subsidy measure included in the model.
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